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THE INS AND OUTS OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: CHOOSING BETWEEN INTERNAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND EXTERNAL DEMANDS 
William Donoher, Mi ssouri State Uni vers ity 
This studv examiued the effects of resource developmeut, resource depcudeuce, aud orgauizatioual let;itima(l' 011 th e 
iucideuc~ of baukmptcy usiug a matched-pair sample r~f distressed orgauizatious. Cousisteut 1vith th eoretical 
expectatious, both related di ver.fi(icatiou aud tlt e level of discretiouary assets at th e firm 's disposal uegatil•ell' related to 
haukruptcy. Legitimaq, m easured hy 111arket ''aluatiou , mediated t!t e latter relatirlll .fhip , but 11111 th e form er. suggestmg 
/hat proper use of intemal competettcies Cllll o{(1·et pressure or lack ofsupportfrom exterual CO IIStitu eut.f. 
I TROO UCTIO N 
Is corporate bankruptcy a function or inadequate reSO UI"Ce 
deve lopment , the fai lure to mnintain relati onshi ps w ith ex lern nl 
constituencies, espec iall y rhe prov iders of capital to the fim1 
(such as in ves tors and credi tors), 01· some co mb inat ion of th e 
two? Combining perspecti ves from th e 1·esource-based view of 
the firm ( Barn ey, 199 1: Wern er fc lt . 198'-1), resource 
dependence th eory (Pfeffer & Sa lancik , 1978) , and institut ional 
theory (D iM agg io & Powell , 1983: Sco tt, 1995), thi s ani c le 
adds to ex istin g research by exa mining th e influence o f firm 
resources and organizati onal leg itimacy on the inc idence o f 
bankruptcy among d istressed fi nn s. Chapter I I bnnkruptc ies 
are the focus o f thi s study, beca use, unlike liquidati ons un der 
Chapter 7 of th e Bankruptcy Code, Chapter I I reorgani za ti ons 
assume th at so me va lue remains and th at the ot·gani zati on can 
be saved. Thus, th ere is more va ri ance in c ircumstances and 
conditions, and more to stu dy ll' ith respect to resout·ces and 
relati onshi ps th an would be tru e of l iquid ::l tin g organi zat ions. 
which in most cases in vo lve the weal-- es t o f the d istressed firm 
populati on. 
The model deve loped and tes ted herei n th eo t·izes th at 
leg itimacy med iates the re l a t i o n s hi p~ betll'ec n resout·cc 
deve lopment and resource dependence and th l' l ikelihood or 
bankruptcy. T he fra mework ::1dopt ed in thi s stud ; thu s 
fac ilitates inqui ry into th e relati ve contributin n o r int ernal 
development and ex tern al relati onshi ps to th e firm and i ts 
management of distress. an issue not fu ll y ex p lored in prev ious 
research, whil e also prov id ing a de f:~ c t o co mpari son o f th e 
forego ing th eoreti ca l lenses. T he ani c le begins by sketching th e 
th eory underl y ing the stud). aft er whi ch result s at·e presen ted 
and di scussed. 
Theory and H y potheses 
The ex istin g body o f research in ves t ig:-~ lin g organizat ion::!l 
distress and bankru ptcy has. Cor th e most pan . focused on the 
identifi ca ti on o f bankruptcy antecedents. For exa mp le, studies 
inquiring into th e govem ancc ch<mJc teri sti cs of bankrupt fim1 s 
(e.g., Dail y, 1995 , 1996 : Da il y & Da lton. 199-l a. 199'-lb, 199 5: 
Ga les & K esner. 199'-1). inc lud ing th e inc idence of" o ffi ce r and 
director replacement (G il son. 1989, 1990: G il son & 
Vetsuypen . 1993 : Hotchk iss. 1995) , have been preva lent in the 
literature. Research also has begun to in vesti gate many o f th ese 
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relati onships in th e post-ba nkru ptcy cont ex t (e.g., Daw ley. 
1-l o ffma tl & Lam ont . 2002 : Brockma nn et al. , 200-1, 2006). 
Perh aps surpri sing ly, th ough, studi es exami ning th e 
1·eso urce di mensions of bankruptcy have bee n relative ly rare. 
So me (e .g. Da il y & Dalton, 199'-lb) have pa rti a ll y reli ed upon 
t·csout·ce dependence (P feffer & Sa lanc ik . 1978) as an 
ex p lanatory framework fo r constituent -firm resource fl O\\'S. 
Oth er , such as Hambrick and D'A vcni 's (1988 . 1992: D'Aveni. 
1989) "downward spiral" research. have inves ti gated th e 
premi se th at distressed firm s face a condit ion o f "decreasing 
intern al resource munifi cence over t im e" ( D 'Ave ni , 1989: 578). 
T hi s body o f work emphas ized the effec ts of dec l ining 
fin ancial (e.g., D'A veni , 1989 : H ambri ck & D 'A \ eni . 1988) and 
manageri al resources ( D 'Aveni , 1989: Hambri ck & D'Aveni , 
1992). 
T hese studi es thu s supp01  th e intuiti ve noti on th at resource 
su ffi c iency, or mun ificence (D'Aveni , 1989) , is related to finn 
surv i va l. Wh at has no t been fu ll y deve loped. h011ever. is th e 
sys temi c interrelat ionship among potenti al and actu ~ll resource 
deve lopment . the eva luat ion and leg itim ati on of such 
de1·c lopment ac t i\ it ics b) ex tern al constituents or the firm , and 
th e li l-- c lihood o r bani--ruptcy among d ist ressed firms. 
1\ i llrcO\ er. th e ro le o f organt za ti onal legi t imac), panicular ly as 
app li ed to co t-porate ba nkru ptcy, is large ly undeve loped. In 
clc1 eloptng thi s th eme. th e d tscuss ion to lo ll ow begi ns ll' ith th e 
c iTec ts of licm reso ut·ces O il th e incide tlCC of billl krupt cy, 
inc lu d i ~ til e ro le o r both reso urce devel op ment and resource 
dcpc tJ dct lcc . lo ll oll'ed by co n s id e t -~lli o n o f the nature and 
c iTec ts or o rga ni z:~ ti o n a l leg it imac:- . 
Reso urces: Oe\'elop ment and Dependen ce 
T he rc~ource-basecl view of the firm ( " RB V") is concerned 
ll' it h th e in t e rn :~ I accum ulation of :-~ sse t s ( Pctera r. 1993) :-~nd the 
ex tent to 11 hi ch such indi v idu al resource cn d0\1 ments are "ti ed 
se mipcrmancntl y to th e firm" ( \Vcrn crfe l t. 198-1 : p . 17?.: sec 
also PctcnJI', 1993). T hus, sustainable co tn pc titi vc ildva ntage is 
seen as a fun cti on o f th e fi nn 's resource end owments. to the 
extent th at such endowments consist o r asse ts that :~t·e va lua b le. 
1·arc. imperfec tl y imitab le, ilnd itnmu11e to th e crea ti on. 
cle\e lopment or acquisit ion of substitute fac tors t hat arc 
th emselves va luable, rare and im per fect ly imitabl e ( Garn ey. 
1986. 199 1, 199-1: O li ve r, 1997: Penrose. 1959) . Thi s 
res tr icti on is imposed beca use under any other ci rculll st<ln ces, 
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the fi rm ' co n1pctit ors ca n be ex pected to repli ca te its 
cap ;-~b i lit i es and th ereby negate any int erim advantage created 
a'> a result o f th ose capabi liti es ( Barn ey. 199 1: O li ver, 1997 : 
Peteraf, 1993). Recogniti on o i'thc role o f int crmil acc umulati on 
anJ developJnCJJ! ncccssarJI ) lmpl lcalcs idcntili c<J ii on o i' th e: 
<Jc t iv iti es and 1xocesses that firm s can utili Le 10 enhance th eir 
asset po itions. onscquent ly, lim1 s th at are ab le t 
cont in uously de ve lop assets or to in vest in processes o f thi s 
nature wi ll be success ful : th ose th at cannot may well eventuall y 
become bankruptcy candidates . 
One resource deve lopm ent ac ti v it y that has been recogni zed 
in th e li terature, and w hich also is releva nt to the contex t o f 
organizati on a I distress , is th e firm's d i versi ti c at ion strategy. 
T he questi on can be posed as fo llows: Is a distressed 
organ izat ion better o tT d ive rsify in g away from its primary 
mark et in conformit y w ith portfo l io th eory (Luba tk in & 
Chatt erj ee, 1994) , or· shoul d it in stead undert ake related 
d ive rsifi ca ti on to max imize its ex istin g competencies? For 
d istressed fi rrn , conv inc ing argum ents fo r each o f these 
alternati ves ca n be ad vanced, but th e answe r has not been 
c !car l y demo ns! rated in t 11 is contex t. I n studi es fram ed outs ide 
th e domain o i' organi zati o nal di stress, b th L ubatkin ;-~ n d 
Chatt erj ee ( 1994) and M ark ides and W i II iJmson ( 1994) 
showed th at related d ive rsifi ca ti on prod uces superi or results to 
th ose ac hieved by um elatcd di 1ersitiers. 13ro<Jdl y speaki ng. 
ho lh studi es theor iLed tllilt related di1·crsi li ca ti on facili tat es th e 
<;ynerg ist ic (r<lll 'i kr o r compctenc ic: s <Jrld th e deve lopment o f 
new strateg ic asse ts. 
13ergh ( 1995 ) r·c l icd upon si rnr 1<11· r·e<JSll nlr1 g to ar·guc: 1 hil l 1 Il l· 
r·esource stoc" o r the lirrn could be crnpl o)ed in order 10 ob1<1ir1 
two difrerent kind s of ccon onliC bc n e lit ~ : I ) COOpera ti ve and 
strateg ic, and 2) co lnpcti tJ ve <tnd ti n<m cial. 'I he for rn er is b~1 sed 
upon th e oppo nun ity to sln re spec iali zed resources, w hile th e 
latt er ari ses from intern al ca pita l market effi c iencies , or the 
abi lit y to re<J II ocatc ca p ital more efli c ient ly th an throug h 
l!X tern al investments. Bergh ( 1995 ) th en posited th at related 
di ve rsifi ca ti on fac il itated th e sharing o f spec ial ized resources, 
and th ere fore th e deve lopment o f inimitab le competenc ies , 
w hile unrelated d ive rsi ti ca l ion, even i f rca li z ing signi fi cJnt 
financ ial economics, would not lead to th e crea ti on o f such 
resources (Berg h, 1995. 1998) . In th e case of the lal!er, <m y 
firm engag ing in unrelated di ve rsifi c:ll ion could achieve simi lar 
result s; fin anc i:.d econorn ies <He simp ly not sufli c ient l y 
'> pec iali Led to con t'c r competiti ve ad va nt age . It is important to 
no te that th ere i <; no structur:il reason either to prefer or avo id 
erth er· form o f di ve rsili ca ti on l iH: business units th at emerge 
from such dc:cisions ca n be melded w it hin the ex isting 
organi zati onal <; tru ctu re or cst:1 bli shed as lega ll y separate 
enti t ies. T hu s, th e fund amenta l dec ision is one o f eco nomi c 
value ra th er th an :, tr·ucture or legal entitkment. 
I he log ic of the forc:go rng r e~carc h ca n be app l ied ID th e 
ca <, e o f distrc:sse d nrg<Jni;ation '> . /\ s between b;rnkrup t lirrns 
drld non-ban"rupt lirrn s, th e c.\ tenl o f rc: laic:d or unrei<J ied 
d rve rsifi cat ion e:1ch undert :t" es should be il d istin gui shin g 
c h ~ 1 ract c r i s ti c bec<tu se of th e implicati ons fo r r·esourcc 
deve lopment and co rn pcti ti ve ad vantage th at th ese strateg ies 
cont'cr. Re lated di ve rsificati on o tTers the fir·m the opportunit y 
to deve lop compet itively va luab le internal resource bases, 
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while unrelated d ive rsifi ca ti on does not. Therefore, bankrupt 
firm s should ex hibit low leve ls of related diversifi ca tion and 
high leve ls of unrelated diversifi ca ti on, w hile th e converse 
should be tru e o f non-bank rupt firms. 
II ypo t hes is I a : Resource deve lopment by means o f 
related di ve r·siti cati on w ill be negiltively related to the 
inc idence o f bankruptcy. 
Hypoth es is I b: Resource deve lopment by means of 
unrelated diversifi ca ti on wi ll be positivel y related to the 
inc idence of bankruptcy. 
A separate issue relevant to the fate o f d istressed 
organi za ti ons is th e relati ve dependence upon ex ternal resource 
providers. For distressed organizati ons, achiev ing and 
maintaining a stock o f "excess" or discreti onary assets for 
subsequent deve lopment, may be prob lematic . Resource 
dependence th eory (Pfeffer & Sa lanc ik , 1978) speaks directl y 
to this issue. T he th eory is concern ed with the degree to wh ich 
a focal organi za ti on is dependent upon, and therefore subject to 
th e contro l of, ex ternal constituencies . Some prev ious work in 
the area o f organi zati onal distress and bankruptcy inco rporated 
resource dependence as a proxy for resource flo w s or cri sis 
mitigati on (sec, e.g., Da il y ( 1996), arguing th at d irec tors wit h 
t ies to th e li rrn 's e· ..: m al env ironment would facilitate th e 
firm 's reorgani 7a t ion e iTo n s). In thi s sense. then, some 
dependence upor1 ex ternal agent s may be benefi c ial to the 
orga11 i La I ior1. No te, however·. th at thi s int erpretati on may be 
l imi tc:d to th e: post-cri sis t im e: frarn e. Pri or to the onse t o f cri sis, 
Pfetler il lid S:1lancik argued , "to th e ex tent th at the foca l 
organi La t ion is subj ec t to success ful ex ternal influence 
att empts. i t p laces it se l f in a situati on in whi ch it s long-term 
sur viva l may be th rea tened" ( 1978 : 95). 
T hus, surv iva l or failure may depend upon th e ex tent to 
w hich th e orga ni za tion has d iscreti on to act and assets that are 
ava il ab le to support th at acti on. Where ex tern al constituents 
account for, or have c laims upon, a significant proporti on of the 
firm 's capi tal utili zati on potential, the firm 's dependence 
increases and it s d iscreti on decreases. O n th e o th er hand, if the 
firm is ab le to maintain or ge nerate assets over and above the 
leve l prov ided by or commill ed to ex tern al constituenc ies, the 
opposite would ho ld tru e. For d istressed organi zati ons, the 
abi lit y lll avo id contro l or to submit to ex ternal demands 
depends tlr5t upon th e balilncc of debt and eq uity in the l~nn 's 
cap ital stru cture, fo r these ca rry signifi ca ntl y different 
consequences lo r th e firrn ( /\ li en & Cote, 2005), with debt 
assuming grea ter importance and contro l as th e leve l o f distress 
increases ( L i & Simerl y, 200::! ) . 
13ut while indebtedness implies a loss o f di screti on by the 
foca l organi ;:a ti on, gw ss n1 ca sures o f indebt edness alone do not 
surtice as adequ;~te indi cators o f contro l, at least not in a sense 
consi>!c:n t w ith resource dependence th eory. T roub led firm s 
o ft en bear· ..:>-cess leve ls o f debt , and thu s any systematic 
distin ct ions among th em rnu st be a functi on of the specifi c debt 
cont racts or arrange 111 ents found in th eir respective cap ital 
structures. Thi s is because, as a practica l and lega l matter, 
credit ors cl i f!C r in th eir relative power and lega l entitlements 
(G i I son, 1989, 199 1; Weiss, 1990) . In terms of bankrupt cy law, 
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co llatera li zation and priority o r c laims serve to di f ferentiate the 
rights of each creditor or group o f creditors (Fe lsenfeld, 1996) . 
Thus , secured debt can be expected to exert stronger c laims on 
the firm than unsecured debt due to th e ex istence o f ri ghts 
against specific assets; manageri al discreti on with respect to the 
use, possess ion or sa le o f such assets is lim ited. 
Short-term cred itors also exert signifi cant innuence on the 
decisions of th e finn . While debt generall y is posited to lead to 
incentive intensit y (J ensen, 1986), short-term debt has a 
significant ef fect in thi s regard because o f the prox imity o f 
repayment and the li kelihood o f default (D iamond, 1993) . 
Holders of short-t erm c laim s thu s can be ex pected to ex tract 
concess ions from management as a conditi on o f renewa l or 
extension of th e cred it ( W hite, 1989). 
Thus. from a resource dependence perspec ti ve, th e relevant 
indicators o f ex tern al contro l in th e contex t o f organi za ti on:1 l 
distress are th e levels o f secured and short- term debt fo und i11 
th e focal firm's capi ta l stru cture. Dependence ex ists i rt he firm 's 
di sc reti onary reso u1·cc s do not exceed th ose co mmined to m 
under th e contro l o r creditors. such as short - term or sec ured 
creditors, wh o arc ab le to constrai n the fi nn 's :Jct iv it ies. A s and 
to the extent such d isc ret ionary resou1·ces exceed committed 
resources, th e firm's dependence can be expected to d imini sh. 
Thus, high levels o f either form o f indebtedness, in 1·elati on to 
th e assets ava ilable to th e organi za t ion that are not so 
comm itted, w ill lead to cond itions o f high ex tern al contro l and 
innuence ove r th e firm's dec isions. In such cases, lower leve ls 
of d iscreti onary assets and higher levels of dependence, as 
indicated by the proporti on o f secured and short-term debt 
owed by the firm , w ill increase th e l ikelihood o f bankruptcy, 
whil e higher levels o f d iscreti onary asse ts w ill reduce 
dependence and increase di scret ionary in vestm ent and th e 
likelihood o f surv i val. 
H ypot hes is 2: D iscreti onary assets :J t the fi rm ·~ 
di sposal, spec ifi c:-J IIy th ose UllCO Jnnli lled to sec ured 01· 
shon-term credi to1·s. wi ll be ll C);;<ll i ve l: related to the 
inc idence o f bankru ptcy . 
Legitimacy 
T he noti on o r leg itim :J cy is centl·al to insti tu ti onal th eory's 
( DiM agg io & Powe ll , 1983 : Sco tt, 1995) ex pl an<l t iOll of 
isomorphi sm . th e tendenC) o f organ izati ons to adopt sim il :n 
structures, strateg ies and prac t ices. M any defin iti ons o f the 
construct ex ist, but fun dament all y kg it imacy illl o l ves or refer~ 
to the ex tent o f congru ence "betwee n th e prac ti ces ... o r th e 
organi za ti on and th ose th at a1·c cont ained w ith in. appro\ ed of. 
and enforced by th e soc ial sys tem in w hich th e org:1 niz::1 ti on 
ex ists" (Z imm erm an & Ze it z, :-!002 : 4 16), which wi ll res ul t in 
"cultural support" lo r th e org:J ni z:J ti on (M eyer & Scotl. 198 3). 
A lthough some firm s m:1y be in a pos ition to w ith stand 
norm ati ve press ures emanatin g from their soc ial sys tems 
(O li ver, 199 1), and although so me degree of d i ve rge nce 
between the norm and the fi nn's strateg ic pos ture may be 
necessary to create competiti ve advant age and enhance 
performance ( Deephouse. 1999} , a patt ern o f general 
conformit y w ith accepted, and en forceable. standard pmc ti ce is 
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a precursor o f legitimacy. In return , firm s th at are vi ewed as 
legitimate are able to acquire higher qualit y resources on more 
favo rable terms than firm s whose legitim acy is suspect 
(Deephouse, 1999) . 
The implicati on o f such obse rvat ions is th at leg itimacy is 
criti cal to firm surv iva l (G reening & Gray, 1994 ; O li ver. 1997; 
Z immerm an & Zeit z, 2002), espec iall y among organizati ons 
reliant upon capital from ex tern al sources. T he same log ic 
app l ies to th e case o f distressed and dec lining organi zat ions. 
A lthough establi shed firm s in general may be ab le to der ive 
legitimacy f rom past perform ance , di stressed firn1 s are li kely to 
lose legitim acy as a consequence or dec lini ng resource bases 
(e .g., Hambri ck & D 'A veni , 1988 , 1992). questi onable or 
unclear strateg ies and/or a loss o r manager ial credibi l ity 
( Dee phouse, 1999; Z immerm an & Ze itz, 2002) . T he loss o f 
leg itimacy, in turn , is l ikely to im peri l orga ni z~ ti o n a l surviva l 
in th e absence o f an in dependent abi l ity to generate intern al 
capit al to o ff set th :1 t lost as a consequence of d imi nished 
leg it imacy. 
l11 th e co ntex t o f thi s stud y, the l inkage between legi t imacy 
and sur v iva l can be ex pected to p lay out in the arena or marke t 
va luat ion. A s th e fi rm loses th e confidence of in vestors, either 
because o f apparent dec l ine or an inabi l it y to convincing!) 
ex plain it s strategy, it s mark et va luati on is l ike ly to decrease, 
and w ith it th e ti m1 ' s abi l i ty to raise equ it y capi tal at an 
acceptable cost. T he exa mple of Kn1::1 rt Corp. is instructive in 
thi s regard . Kmart 's co mpeti ti ve trava i ls we re apparent fo r 
some tim e, and eve ntuall y th e cap ital markets responded by 
sending the company's stock int o a free fal l. T his outcome had 
th e e ffect o f increasing K mart ' s rel iance on trade cred ito1·s and 
ba nks fm w orkin g capit al, w h ich even tua ll y also w ithdrew 
support w hen it beca me c le:1 r th at the co mpany could not 
reverse it s dec l ine (M ull er. 200:-!a, 200:-!b) . T hus, cap ital mark et 
support is dependent upon the fi rm 's ab ilit y to deve lop and 
art iculate a cre d ib le strateg ic rat ionale, <1bsc nt wh ich th e fi rm 
w ill become increasing ly relia nt on debt and more likely to fa il. 
Gi , en thi s rel::llionshi p be t\\ ec n orga ni zati ona l leg itim acy and 
S UI'\ i v~ l . leg i ti mac y, in teml S of th e fi rm 's mari.. et va luati on, 
wi ll mediate the relati onship be twc:e n the fi rm 's resource 
postu 1·c < J it s surv iv:J I prospec ts. A cco rdi ng ly, 
H y pothes is 3: Leg iti mac: w ill med 1ate th e relati onship 
bc t\\ ee n the fi rm's J'C~o urcc-; (bot h reso urce 
deve lopment and d iscret ionary rc <; ou J-ces) and the 
inc idence of bankru ptc;. 
1\l ET IIO DS 
Sample 
T he S<l lllp fc fm th e present ~tud y is co mpri sed o r firms 
ex peri enc ing linanc ial di stress betwee n 1990 and 1996, 
inc lusi ve, years p1·ior to the signi fi ca nt I:J te-90s ex pansion and 
dur ing which bankruptcy act iv it y was signi fi ca nt enough to 
make exami nati on feas ible. Post-2000 b:J nkrupt c ies, many of 
w hich invo l ved internet startu ps, '' ere exc luded beca use the 
business models and intern al dynam ics o f such firm s l ike ly 
m ise d i ftc 1·ent issues thJn th ose ::1 pp l icab le to estJb l ished , but 
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dec lining, fim1 s. T he bankrupt finr1 sample was drawn from th e 
13ankruptcy Yearbook and A lm anac (e .g., Da il y, 1996) , an 
annual publi ca ti on of New Ge nerati on Resear·ch th at prov ides a 
co rn pendium o l· rn<ljor b<lll krupt cy deve lop ment s and filings. 
spec ifi call y those in w h ich lirrn asse ts exceed $ 100 milli on. 
l ' inall y , cornp::1 r1i cs inc lud ed in th e snrn ple we re lirn ited to th ose 
\1 ith pub l ic i) tr ::1 ded equ it) , J S opposed to th ose w ith only 
rnrbl ic l) trad ed debt or th ose o th erw ise subj ec t to publi c 
reportin g obli ga ti ons. 
onsistent \-1 ith th e purposes o f thi s stud y, matched 
surv ivo rs we re identifi ed on th e basis o f total indebtedness. 
Using Compact Disc los ure and Co rnpu Stat as data sources, 
firrn s we re matched aga inst each bankrupt firm 's pr imary four-
d ig it SIC code and deb t-to-asse t rati o in th e filin g year. Thi s 
approach permit s compa r·ison between ba nkrupt and non-
bankrupt companies on th e bas is of industry , as wa s tru e of th e 
previous resea rch (Da i ly, 1995 , 1996; Da il y & Da lt on, 1994a, 
1994 b, 1995) . ll owcve r, by incorporatin g th e debt -to-asset rati o 
as a meas ure o f finan c ial d istr·ess (F lagg, G iroux, & Wigg ins, 
1991), thi s tud y l imits th e co mpari son to those firm s simi larl y 
situated to th e ba r1 krupt fi r·ms w ith respect to leve rage. Size 
was inco rporated as an add iti onal guide to th e match, but not 
employed as a direc t matching cri teri on. A post-identifi cati on 
va I id ity chcc i- r·evea led th at no stat ist ica ll y signifi cant 
difTe rencc in si;.e or th e rn <il ching cr it eri a ex isted between the 
tii 'O sets or fi rm s. 
lr1 several i rl , tJ rl ccs. 110 va l id milt ches 0 11 th ese mea sures 
C\ rsted , and acco r·ding ly th e bank rupt fim1 wa s e:-:c luded l·r·orn 
th e Sil mplc . M<rtche' th at e01 rl d be ickntifi ed we re abo noss-
checked aga ir1stt hc 13a nkrup tC) A ln1iln :1c's lr sts o l' ba nkruptc rc'> 
rn both preced ing ar 1d subsequ ent years to c r1 sure th at th e: matcil 
w<:~ s not itsel f c:i th cr a rcorganr ;.cd firm currentl y oper<r trn g 
outside o f ba nkr·upt cy or an eventual ba r1krupt. Wh ere such wa s 
the ca se. th e prospec ti ve mat ch wa s exc luded and a new rn atcli 
wa s so ught. Th is pmce durc r-esulted in a tota l sa mpl e o r 220 
lirm s. co mpri sed o !' I I 0 ba nl-nrpt firms and I I 0 survi vo rs. 
Va riables 
Data w ere co llec ted for til e year preceding th e fi l ing yea r in 
order to fac i litate iso lation o f th e resource !"'acto rs contr·ibutin g 
to th e bankruptcy occ urr ing in til e subsequent yea r (D<:~ i l y , 
1995) . A II da ta, oth er tlnn the dependent mcas1rr·e , we re 
obtained fmm fim1 I OK r·e pon s, pmxy statements, and th e 
Compu Swt :~nd Co mpac t Di sc losure cbtabases. T he dependent 
vari ~.rbl e , o r co ur·se, is th e in c idence o r bnnkruptcy, a 
dicho tomous rn c:asur-c coded as 0 fo r· th e non-bil nkrupt firm s 
and I lo r th e ban i-nr pt fim1 s (Dai ly , 1995 , 1996 ; Dai ly & 
Dalton , 199<-la , i 99Li b, 199-'i ; ll arnbrick & D'i\vcni , 1981:;) . 
l' rev ious -, tudie -, ( l)ai l), 199-'i: l) :ril y & !)a lto n, 1994<1 , 
199-lb) enipl llycd rn c ~ r s ur·e s or firm size, pr inc ipall y til e natur:-~ 1 
lo !.2_ or total ass c: t'i (S irl !.!,h. 191:;6), <IS <l contm l, and thi s v;11·iab lc 
w~s utili ;cd in th e: l~ r · c s c rll stud y as we ll Liquidit y, here 
Lk fi r1 cd ;1-; th e r:iliu u l- cur-rent <r -,sc ts to fi :-:cd assc: ts. <il 'o 11' <1 '> 
rntrndu ced as,, contr·o l ( l ) <til ) , 199 -'i . l ):til y & D:llt on . l l)9Lia, 
fl)l)..Jb ; l' lagg, ct :11 .. ll)l) I ) i\ ccu r·ding to thi s v iew, erth cr over-
or· umlcr-i rl vc c, tn1 erl t i r1 l iqu id or- li x ~:d assets rna y resul t in a 
1111 \ lll cll ch between th e urgani.G:l ti on and til e cl ern ands or it s 
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environment. Finall y, e<:~c h firm' s level of so lvency was 
inc luded as a contro l in order to provide a de facto test of the 
intuiti ve ex planati on o f bankr·uptcy. Based upon the concept of 
equitab le inso lve ncy, w hich is defin ed as th e abi lit y to pay 
debts as th ey mature (Warren & W estbrook , 1986), thi s 
vil ri ab le wa s ca lcul ated as th e difference between the firm's 
operatin g cas h fl o w (EB IT + deprec iati on - taxes) and interest 
ex pense in o r·cl cr to capture th e noti on of debt cove rage and the 
ab il ity to sati sfy current ob liga ti ons (Ross, Westerfi eld, & 
Jor·dan, 1993) . T he result was then div ided by total assets in 
order to norm ali ze fo r firm size. Thi s measure also avo ids any 
d irect overlap w ith firm leverage, w hich was utili zed as a 
matching va ri ab le, or with th e asset -based measures o f 
resources comprising th e independent variab les. 
With respect to th e resource-based hy poth eses, 
d iversifi ca ti on was ca lcul ated by mea ns of th e entropy measure 
(Pa lepu , 1985) , whi ch fac ilitates decomposi ti on of th e firm's 
sales per market segm ent into ind ices o f related and unrelated 
d iversi fi ca ti on. T he m eas ure's constru ct va lid ity has been 
establi shed by empiri ca l research ( Hoski sson, et al. , 1993). 
T he resource dependence hy poth esis requires the iso lati on 
of discreti onary assets in relati on to th ose committed to secured 
or short-t erm credito rs. Po llowi ng th e general patt ern provided 
by Hambri ck and D 'Aveni 's ( 1988) measure of unabsorbed 
slack, t o measures based upon each lirrn 's current and fi xed 
<r S'>C t ava i lab ilit y were cremed . In order to estab li sh the 
r·elrni onshi p betwee n resource ava il ab ilit y nnd th e spec ifi c 
pmv idc r·s o f ca pita l m ost ab le to res tri ct th e acti v iti es o f the 
lim1 (Dril mOrld . 1993: Ma rm , 1997a , 1997b; White, 1989), 
co nsi<; tcrlt wit h th e rcso ur-c~: dependence prem ise o f the 
hypothesis. th e sum o f the fi rm 's short -term and sec ured debt 
w<~ s s ub t r <:~c t c d from it s current and li xed assets, respecti ve ly. 
Afte r divid ing th e difference by total assets to norm ali ze for 
fim1 size , th e two m eas ures w ere combined using principle 
components analys is (S tevens. 1996), w hi ch has th e effect o f 
transformin g co rr·elatcd va ri ab les int o an unco rrelated measure, 
thereby also reduc ing <:~ n y co r-relati ons w ith th e liquidit y 
contro l. Addi ti onall y, the approach fac ilitates deve lopment of a 
parsimonio us va r iab le stru ctur·e based upon multiple m easures 
of th e construc t at iss ue. T he resultant factor scores w ere sa ved 
<:~ n d entered in to th e regress ion equati on LIS th e di screti onary 
asset measure. 
Leg itirn ncy, as outlined above, rell ects ex tern al judgments 
o f th e firm 's acti v iti es and capabi l iti es . Consistent w ith thi s 
discuss ion. a m easure of the firm 's m ark et valuati on w as used, 
agil in lagged one ye<:~ r , in ord er to ca pture th e noti on o f an 
ex tern al capi tal prov ider 's acceptance o f th e organi za ti on' s 
prac ti ces and ca pabi liti es. Ma rket va lu <:~ ti o n in tum affects th e 
fi m1 ' s cos t o f ca pit al and it s ab ilit y to raise cap ital through th e 
equ it y rn <~ r · k e t s ( Ross, Westerfi eld & J o r · d<~ n , 1993) . T he 
spec i fi c ca lcu lati on used here is th e mark et- to-book va lue rati o, 
whi ch :1djusts fo r firm siLe and pmv ides an ind ica tor of the 
rn<tr·ket '<; estimati on o l- th e va lu e :1dded by manage ment. T he 
lii Cil'> ur c rs a v:rriant o f T ob in 's q rati o (G riffith , Foge lberg & 
Wec:k s, 2002), whi ch has been utili zed as a measure o f 
rmrn a ge r i:.~ l qual it y and grow th prospects ( M orek, Shleifer & 
Vi shn y. 1989) . 
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Given the dichotomous dependent var iab le, log isti c 
regression represented th e most effect ive methodology for 
testing the hypothesized effects. T his technique has been 
utilized in prev ious bankruptcy studies (e.g., Dail y & Dalton, 
1994a, 1994b; Hambrick & D ' Aveni , 1988), and presents the 
benefit of avoiding v io lati on of standard multiple regress ion 
assumptions, particularl y th ose pertainin g to heteroscedasti c ity 
and the exi stence of linea r relati onshi ps. A hiera r·chical 
procedure wa s follo wed, whereby the contro ls were entered 
separately and a regress ion equati on estimated and compared to 
that obtained by enterin g th e independent va ri ab les 111 
conjunction with the contro ls. 
The test of H ypothes is 3, proposing a medi ated r·elati onship, 
proceeded in accord ance w ith the methodo logy sugges ted by 
Baron & K enny ( 1986) , accord ing to whi ch mediati on is 
estab li shed when the effect o f the independent va ri ab l · s on th e 
dependent vari able is weaker when th e media tor is added to the 
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regress ion equati on. Pani al mediati on ex ists when the 
relati onship is weaker but still stati sti ca ll y signifi cant , while 
full mediation ex ists when thi s relati onship is not stati sti ca ll y 
signifi cant in the presence of the mediator. 
Results 
Table I presents th e pattern of co rrelati ons and descripti ve 
stati sti cs for th e variab les included in the study. A t the 
outset, note that bankrupt companies are assoc iated wi th 
lower leve ls o f related diversifi ca t ion, discreti onary asse ts, 
and market va luati ons than their non-b::tnk ru pt counter·parts. 
None of these outcomes is surpri sing or unanti c ipated gi ven 
th e discuss ion above. Note also that the so lvency m e::~ s ure does 
not correlate at a stati sti ca ll y signifi ca nt leve l w ith th e 
inc idence of ba nkruptcy, alth ough its sign is nega t ive as one 
woul d suspect. T he lack o f stati sti cal signifi cance, however, 
support s th e noti on that the samp le fimt s were in fact equall y 
distressed. 
Tab le I: Co rrelations and Desc ripti ve Statistics 
-
I.Fik* )()() 500 1.000 
2 Assets(ln ) Cl.IIOO I 25() . () } ~ I 000 
J .C urrc tll assct s/ !"t x~d -~~ (, 256 . 0 ~ 2 -.072 
4.Solvencv . 088 I 0~ 3 . 092 .055 
5.Re lnted di versili cati on .on . 193 -. I SS .227 
6.Li nrelated di versifi cat ion 127 . 2 4~ -.003 .037 
7.Di screti onary nsscts 000 1.000 -.233 .0 78 
S.Mki. vn lue .3 65 538 -.310 -. 11 8 
N = 220. Bo ld va lues indica te signi fi cance at .05 leve l and 
below (va lues of .225 and above signifi ca nt at .00 1 leve l, and 
I 000 
.080 I 000 
. 090 024 I 000 
0~ 0 -.026 .1 67 I 000 
.078 .3 -1 8 . 00 1 . 066 1.000 
.0 19 028 . 04 3 -.020 .277 1.000 
va lues of . 185 and above significant at .0 I leve l). *Coded as 0 
= no filin g, I = fi l ing. 
Table 2: Res ults of Hierarchical Log istic Regress ion A nalyses 
Ste p One (Controls) 
~A~s~s c~· t s~(~l'~' )~~~----~~- -~0~3~- --~~-~1 0~1 ____ 1~0~1~0--~ 
Curre nt <b Sets/ lixcd .208 330 2~3 
So lvcnc\ - 1~1 <) -93 7 -1 () 7:i 
Step T11 o (M~i n Ellccts) 
Rel:licd d1 vers. -2S l9 -2 .1iS2 
Umclatccl ':::.:li-'-\ C:::r::...s ______ -l 05 ~ · 0 16 
l)i scrwona r·;_v,-:a:::.:s s~c~"----~------4..:.- :.::· Sc.:~ ::.0 __ -+_·..:.2:..::2.:.9 __ _ 
Ste p Three ( ~ledi:Jtur) 
-1.332 
. OJ ~ I ~ 3 t-273 _ 
I 09 I Jll 
----~-----
T abl e 2 prov ides the results of th e hypoth es is tests. Bo th the 
main effects and mediated models ( 111 odels 2 and 3, 
respecti ve ly) signifi cantl y increment the initial control model, 
supportin g interpretati on of the test models. H ypoth eses I a and 
I b predicted. respecti ve ly, a negati ve relati onshi p between 
related di versifi ca ti on and bankruptcy and a pos iti ve 
relati onship between unrelated diversifi ca ti on and bankruptcy. 
Related diversifi ca ti on is signifi cantl y and nega ti ve ly related to 
th e incidence of bankrupt cy (b= -2 .599, p< .O I ), suppor1ing 
hypothesis I a. However, hypoth es is I b is not supported, g iven 
the stati sticall y in signifi cant va lue o f the unrelated 
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d iversificat ion coe ffi c ie!lt. T he pos iti ve sign of rit e coeffi cient 
is consistent with th e ex pec ted re l ::~t i o n s lti p , but no sta tist ica l 
inference can be drawn from thi s result. 
Hypoth es is 2 predi cted a negat ive relat ionship between the 
leve l of disc reti onary resources and th e incidence of 
bankrupt cy . T his hypoth es is is supported . T he disc ret ionar·y 
asse t coeffici ent is negat ive and signi ficant (b= - .55 0, p<.OO I ), 
indicating th at firm s whose resources are not co mmi tt ed to 
powerful creditors are more li kely to surv ive than th ose whose 
resources must be substantiall y reserved for payment of 
spec i fi e c lai ms. 
5
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The media ted relati onships are reported in M ode l 3 o f tab le 
2 abo ve. A s set fo rth above, th e test in vo lved inc lusion of th e 
market valuati on variab le in a separate model w ith th e 
independen t va ri ab les arte r estimation of th e main effects o f th e 
la tt c1· (Baron & Kenny, 1986) . As ca n be in fe1Ted from Tab le 2, 
part ia I support ex ists fOI' h ypot hes is 3. T he 1n arket va luati on 
coeffi cient is negati ve and h ighl y signi fi cant (b= -2 .332 , 
p .00 1) . In thi s model, ho weve r, the di sc reti onary asset 
coeffi cient is not stati st ica ll y signifi ca nt , ind icatin g fu ll , rath er 
th an partial , med iatio n of thi s relati onship . Moreover, th e 
st::t l ist ica I signifi ca nce of th e 1·c lated d iversi fi ca I ion coeffi c ient 
is unchanged, although it s :1bso lute va lue is moderately higher 
in thi s equat ion. These findin gs suggest that market va luati on 
docs not medi ate th e relati onshi p between related 
di ve rsification and bankruptcy. T hus. leg it imacy, in terms of 
mar·ket va luation, fu ll y medi::ttes the relati onshi p between a 
firm 's discretionary assets and th e inc idence of ba nkruptcy, but 
does not mediate th e relat ionshi p between related 
diversifi ca tion and th e inc idence o fb:1nk rupt cy . 
Dependent variab le = fi l ing (I = filin g, 0 = no filin g). N = 
220 . Bo lded va lues are sign ifi ca nt at .0 1 leve l. Coe f fi c ients are 
unstandard ized . M ode l compari sons for F va lues and -2LL 
change are between cont ro l model ( model I ) and main effects 
moclc l ( model 2 ), and between main effec ts model ( mode l 2) 
and med iated m ode l (mode l 3) . 
Discussion aud Co nc lusio n 
Thi s resea rch attempted to provide ar1 int egr<llcd framcwOI'k 
fo r considerati on of the cfTec ts o f a firm 's r ·e~O UI'Ce posture O il 
th e incidence o l· b:1nf..rup1c v. The r·esour-ce -based \ ic\1' of th e 
firm (e.g., Bamey . 1991) prov ided th e th eoretical fo undation 
fo r· th e expected 1·c lati o nshi p be tween th e lirm 's divcrsili cati on 
~ ~~ ·~11e gy, and th ereb y its resource developmen t potential , and 
th e inc idence o f bankruptcy. Resource dependence th eory 
(Pk iTe r· & Sa lanc ik. 1978) , on th e o th er hand , w::t s th e premise 
l(n an ~:ll ) s i s of th e lim1 's re lationshi p to pressure-int ense 
creditors (Dia n10nd . 1993: Man n, 1997a , 1997 b) . Fina ll y, 
eva luati o n of th e med iating m lc o f leg itim acy was supported 
b) instituti onal th eory (e. g ., D iMagg io & Powell , 1983; Sco tt. 
1995), based o n th e noti on th at d istressed organi zations 
e\ peri ence decreasing resou rce munifi cence (D'Aven i. 1989) 
and inc reasing lcgi t im:1c y chal lenges ( Deephouse, 1999; 
L immerman & Ze it z, 2002) th:ll impai r access to ex terna l 
cap ita l. 
Result s associa ted w ith th e hypo thesized main e ffect s 
gc ner·all y were consistent w ith th e ti 1Co r·eti ca l framcwor·k . A s 
e'pected. re lated diversifi ca ti on was nega ti ve ly and 
si"nifi can tl v related to th e inc idence o f bankruptcy . Thi s 
li~din~ is c-onsistent \1 ith th e th eor) <llld findi ngs o r' studi es by 
fk r~ li- ( 1 99 5 ) and Mar·f..idc s and Wi ll iam son ( 199 -l ) . both of 
\ lhi~ h applied th e resource -ba sed v i t.: \1 ' (13 :n ne) . 199 1) to 
dt\ t.: r ~ ifi c ation st1·ateg; and ar·gucd that related di ve rsifi cati on 
prO\ rd c~ lirm s nppon uniti es 10 ~ h r~1 · c kn owledge illlll 1\:sourcc s 
i11 ~ u c li a w:1 y as tu 1;1c ilit:llc' th e devc lop tnerll o f competitively 
\ a luable, nonrcplicable res om ces. I f' tl1i ~ is indeed th e outcome 
o frc l r~ t cd di versili cc 1t ion , th c r1 it lo llows th at lirms di\e1 sify ing 
11110 hi gh l) related in dustri es or market segments wil l deve lop 
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more strateg ic resources and be more likely to survive as a 
consequence th an firm s diversify ing into unrelated industries. 
T he resource dependence ( Pfeffer & Sa lanc ik, 1978) results 
es tablished that firm s w hose assets we re committed to spec ifi c, 
pressure-intense cred itors (D iamond , 1993; M ann, 1997a, 
1997b) we re more likely to fil e for bankruptcy protection. Such 
commitments leave th e firm unabl e to pursue other investm ents 
th at might enhance its surv iva l prospects and increase th e 
power of th ose ho ld in g such c laims aga inst th e firm . Thus, 
consistent w ith th e premises of reso urce dependence theory, the 
ex istence of an identifiabl e, ex tern al locus o f power and 
influence that minimi zes firm discreti on over assets and 
subsequent imperil s th e fi rm . 
T his obse rvati on a I so d ist ingu ishes the present research 
from prev ious studies appl y in g resource dependence theory to 
the contex t of co rporate bankruptcy (e.g. D ail y & Dalton, 
1994b), w hich m odeled board compos ition as a link between 
th e firm and ex tern al constituents and thus adopted a positive 
fra mework fo r dependence effects. O ne of the primary 
contributions of thi s stud y thu s is its hi ghlighting o f the 
negati ve im pli ca ti ons of dependence, inc luding confirmation of 
th e ident ity of pressure- intense creditors whose c laims are 
assoc iated wit h bank ruptcy. Future research should seek to 
deepen understanding of th e dynami cs o f thi s relati onship, 
inc lud ing an ,ys is of the prec ise o rder o f causa lit y ( i .e., 
wheth er d istress inueases creditor power or \Vheth er cred itor 
power increases th e leve l of d istress) . 
T he stud y also contri butes by exa minin g th e mediating 
infl uence o f o rga nizat ional leg itim acy, espec iall y to the ex tent 
different results are observe d wi th respect to resource-based 
and resour·ce dependence outcomes. Spec ifi ca ll y , leg itimacy , as 
mea sured by marke t va luati on. appears to full y m ediate the 
r·elation ship between reso urce depe ndence and bankruptcy, but 
no mediating effects are observed w ith respect to th e resource-
based o r·icntati on o f related d ive rsifi ca ti on. These findin gs 
imp ly th at reso urce -based deve lopment ac ti v iti es direc tl y and 
independent ly contr·ibute to surv iva l, and ind eed that th e firm 
may be ab le to w ithsta nd at leas t a temporary loss o f leg itimacy 
if its resource investments fac ilitate the crea ti on o f 
co mpetitively va luab le resources (Barney, 199 1). In such a 
case, leg itimacy mi ght be ex pected to fo llow, although th e 
quest ion of how long thi s process takes and w hether external 
monitors Ciln fu ll y apprec iate or va lue the tirm 's intern al 
deve lopment prac ti ces must rem ain for future research. 
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T he results have add iti onal implicati ons fo r th eory and 
wacti ce by fa c ilitat ing a co mpari son between th e two 
underl y in g theori es. Dependence on pressure-intense creditors 
sends a sigrw l to th e markets th at, in turn , increases th e 
likelihood of bankruptc y, unl ess o ffset by reso urce 
deve lopmen t acti v iti es. T hi s message prov ides managers w ith a 
c le<J r priorit izati on th at , at base, is consistent w ith th e resource-
b'lscd vie\1 ·s im per::ll i ves (Barn ey. 199 1; W ern erfelt , 1984). 
The disti1 1cti on also n1ay li e. at a th eoreti ca l leve l, in th e 
diflcre nce betwee 11 cesource suf'li c iency and resource qualit y. 
l{ es our-cc depe ndence arguab ly im pli ca tes th e form er, w hile th e 
resource-based v iew rai ses th e questi on o f th e latt er, and th e 
dillerence bl: t lveen th e two, in term s o f future access to capit al, 
ca rTies surv i va l connotati ons. In short , deve lopment o f 
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strategically va luable resou rces appea rs to be a stronger 
independent contributor to success and survival than creat ion 
and maintenance of mere ly a "suffi cient' ' level of resou rces. 
Additional resea rch into the re lati onship between these two 
theories and their attendant deve lopmental processes wou ld be 
critica l to both theory and practice in th ese areas. 
As with any empirica l research, thi s stud y has certain 
limitations. First , the focus on di versification om its va ri ous 
other resource a ll ocation dec isions that mi ght be worth y of 
add itional inquiry. For that matter. changes in di versifi cati on 
posture are not cons idered here. and may provide deeper 
understanding of the dynami cs assoc iated with such strateg ies. 
This re lates to a second potenti a l limitati on of the stud y, which 
is it s cross-secti onal. rather than longitudinal, des ign. The 
purpose of thi s work was to establi sh th e ex istence of 
relationships among the vari ables of interest, but pattern s of 
th ese var iab les over time, both in abso lute terms and relati ve to 
yea r-on-yea r changes. wou ld be of signifi cant intet·es t and 
import ance to th e development of thi s line of inquiry. In shon , 
much work remains to be do ne. but thi s stu dy prov ides a basis 
for future in vesti gati on and elobor<Hio n of a1  impononr set of 
relat ionships. 
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